Review: Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion, Oxford University Press, 2008
1 Paul Collier, The Bottom
Billion, Oxford University Press, 2008
A
basic question that one sees frequently discussed in the course of study of
development economics is quite a loaded one: “Why are some people poor?” And
the answers to this question seem to fall on two very controversial and
distinctly varied camps. On one hand, we have an answer of “Because capitalism
is unfair!” Simple, sweet, and pretty much devoid of universally accepted proof
or evidence. On the other, we have “Because poor people don’t work hard
enough!” Now the answer becomes both inflammatory and downright unscientific.
As such, we have not yet reached a consensus on this simple yet incredibly
layered issue. In the midst of a fast-developing global market, we see what the
adoption of capitalism has done to elevate the standard of living in China,
India, and Asia to new heights. But does the application of free market
principles apply and impact the living conditions of a rural farmer in Chad? In
an attempt to put a sense of rationality to the random, we turn to Collier.
For
the majority of the global population, Collier does not seem to see any
emerging issues in economic development. China and India are star examples of
countries that are on the fast track of catching up with other more developed
nations in a manner that is shockingly similar to how the economies of less
affluent members of the EU – Ireland and Portugal, to name a few – behaved in
the beginning of their respective entry to the global league. Collier believes
that a majority of the world is in a genuine stage of true economic development
that will eventually lead to assimilation with the global community that will
equal more opportunities to each nation’s citizens.
The
problem therefore, Collier states, lies in the subset of countries that fail to
fall in line with this trend of economic development. Many of these countries
have just recently overthrown foreign rule through colonialism as early as the
‘60s. Since their independence, countries like North Korea, Burma, Afghanistan,
and other Central Asian nations have had economic situations that have either
inched their way begrudgingly to a higher quality or worse, have lost headway
and begun the path of slow and steady regression. Collier calls this bottom
billion of the world’s poorest nations as “Africa+”, but the name itself is a
bit of a misnomer. All his examples come purely from Africa, though some
economic insights are applicable to other nations as well.
Taking
inspiration from Jeff Sachs’s designation
of the malaria disease as a “development trap” that prevents a country’s
overall growth, Collier creates four categories of traps that the bottom
billion nations are suffering from. Most of the bottom billion is ailing from
not just one, but two of these specified economic obstacles.
Conflict: Being engulfed in an internal
conflict such as a full-fledged civil war is the most straightforward way to
stunt economic development. Civil wars are a rather long affair to resolve – on
average, six years – and have a significant role in destroying local economy.
Collier’s studies on countries experiencing internal strife have led him to
believe that growth is reduced by an estimated 2.3% per annum. Taking into
account that wars have a ripple effect that reach far beyond national borders
and usually spill over to a country’s neighbors, Collier estimates a $64
billion cost for a single civil war. $64 billion seems like a drop in the
bucket to the resources spent in Iraq, but is already quite a substantial
amount from the viewpoint of the bottom billion. To put it into perspective, 64
billion dollars is just below the GDP of Ethiopia, a country with a population
of approximately 70 million people.
Collier’s
team has also established an unsurprising fact that poor nations are far more
susceptible to civil war than its wealthy counterparts. Collier himself glosses
over ideological causes for civil war, stating that all it takes to start one
is for a large enough group to gain access to weapons, ransack the national
treasury, and begin the exploitation of their country’s national resources. An
average low-income nation has a 14% chance of relapsing into the state of civil
war within a five year period, more if its economy is in a condition of
stagnation or contraction.
Natural resources: For individuals with an interest in international
development with no formal training or education in the economics field,
discovering that most economists cannot answer questions that should be basic
and straightforward is rather unsettling. For instance, an answer to “Does aid
work?” is not a resounding “Yes!” that one expects, but rather a technical
equivalent of a “We don’t know yet.” What’s even more unsettling is the
paradoxical nature of what some would call conventional economic wisdom. Case
in point, being a nation with abundant natural resources is usually a bad thing
from an economic standpoint.
Natural
resources are a juicy price for most criminal elements, but it is surprisingly
not what Collier states is the biggest problem. That would be solely reserved
for what is called the Dutch Disease, an economic phenomenon which pertains to
a negative economic impact created by the discovery of a product or service
that would lead to a large influx of foreign currency into a country’s market.
Coined in the 1960s in an attempt to enlighten the economic community to the
lagging behind of Netherlands’ manufacturing sector after the use and trade of
natural gas became widespread, it operates on a concept of simple cause and
effect. People can be found in all economies that would like foreign currency
to gain imports. As such, they collaborate with domestic exporters who earn
this currency through the sale of goods from within the country. Therefore, in
the event of a discovery of a new resource such as oil, demand for this product
makes the exportation of oil a quick and easy way to earn foreign currency. By
specializing on this, the activity in the sale of this new product leads to
less activity in other sectors like labor-focused manufacturing sectors that have
been greatly beneficial to Asian economies like South Korea and Singapore. The
end result would be an increase in the development of one economic sector with
an equal or greater decline in that of another.
Based
on his studies, Collier believes that understanding the Dutch Disease is a
necessary step in understanding the plight of the bottom billion. The very same
principle can apply to foreign aid as well as newly discovered resources like
oil. Aside from that, he sees that another negative effect can be tied in with
the presence of abundant natural resources: the subversion of democracy.
Ideally, policymakers and government officials benefit from policies that
improve and benefit society as a whole. However, for countries rich in natural
resources, politicians gain more reward for practices of bribery and patronage.
Collier calls this the “survival of the fattest” and points to Nigeria in the 1990s
as an example of its possible ramifications.
Landlocked with bad neighbors: As a general rule, landlocked
nations have more difficulty in the exportation business due to a nonexistence
of ports. Yet Switzerland does not seem to face the same level of problematic
trade like Uganda does. The difference lies in the fact that Switzerland’s
neighbors are relatively rich and can serve markets via the provision of
infrastructure to use the latter’s ports. Uganda, on the other hand, does not
have as much luxury and, as seen in the result of its reliance on Kenya to
export its products, did not have as much luck.
Collier’s
stand on this particular trap is less solid then the rest. His solutions
involve the reliance on remittances to make sure that landlocked nations are
not ‘airlocked’ or ‘e-locked’ because of an unreliable Internet connectivity.
This would be quite the conundrum since the fastest Internet access is
available through the use of expensive undersea cables. Another stated solution
from Collier is an attempt to revise the neighboring countries’ economic
policy, which is rarely if ever accomplished. He wraps this up by stating that
some of the bottom billion who are prey to this trap should not have existed as
independent states in the first place; something he sees is an end result of
Europe’s colonial carve-up.
Badly governed: Governance – that of the poorly executed kind – has been a
hotbed of controversy the U.S. aid community has had experienced great intimacy
with for the past decade. To be the recipient of USAID funds, developing
countries had to build an economic growth program that passes the standards of
good governance and accountability. Unlike the majority of his fellow
economists, Collier has fewer worries on the effects of a dysfunctional
government. He points to Bangladesh as a currently high-performing nation that
has been thriving economically in spite of the fact that it is plagued by one
of the most corrupt governments in history for a number of years. Bangladesh
improved normally through its labor manufacturing sector, a sector that does
not require great government oversight to function in a country with a large
workforce and numerous ports.
Granted,
deviance exists in small nations with an absence of ports like Chad, which
incidentally has a government that is arguably as corrupt as Bangladesh’s.
Usual paths to economic progress are blocked, and positive involvement rather
than the usual apathy from its government is a requirement to begin development
in its economy. It is rather unfortunate that countries such as this have
become unable to service its people in an adequate manner. Angola, Central
African Republic, Haiti, Liberia, Sudan, the Solomon Islands, Somalia and
Zimbabwe are some of the entries of Collier’s list of states that have failed
this political and economic criterion of service. An estimated cost of $100
billion is Collier’s approximation for state failure in terms of citizens of a
nation, its neighbors, and in the global community itself. The chances of
recovery for a country experiencing such a defunct level of governance is
abysmally low at a 1.9% chance per annum.
In
a quick statistical round-up, surveys show that in the bottom billion nations,
73% have undergone civil war, 29% have economies specializing in the
exportation of natural resources, 30% are landlocked countries, and 76% have
gone through periods of bad governance. Some of these countries have the
misfortune of meeting at least three of these four factors. Collier asserts
that the two most prescribed solutions for an ailing developing country – trade
and aid – will have no lasting positive effect in terms of allowing the
nation’s economic base to develop.
Freer
trade could be the answer to uplift the bottom billion, but it has to be the
right kind. Collier notes that Africa’s natural resources stir great interest
in countries like China, but foresees an increase in corruption and a decrease
in economic competition in an economy that focuses solely in the trade of its
natural resources. Most developed countries have a significant percentage of
its economy vested in manufacturing sectors, which have greater earning power
when compared to natural resource exports.
This
does not come without a large investment effort, though. A manufacturing effort
requires major funding to even begin operations. Factory equipment alone would
require massive amounts of financial backing to even begin producing goods for
trade. The surge in global capitalism might lead one to think that investors
with a taste for risk and return would be claiming their stakes on the
uncharted territories of these poor nations’ manufacturing sectors. Sadly,
these markets have been deemed too risky and have repeatedly experienced the
rejection of most international investors. Globalization of free trade has made
sure that finances flow out of these countries, with little to none flowing in.
If ever one would be fortunate enough to strike it rich in the Central African
Republic, one would rather invest those hard earned funds in a safer option
that will almost always be a foreign rather than a local industry. Collier
notices a similar pattern for skilled laborers. Smart, ambitious Chadians would
rather look for their fortunes overseas than stay inside their country’s
borders.
If
globalization is more economic sickness than financial cure, then how about
man’s compassion to his fellow man in the form of foreign aid to the bottom
billion? The answer, according to Collier, would still be a no. He points out
that the bulk of foreign aid goes into the pockets of corrupt politicians rather
than the intended parties due to the flawed state of governance in the bottom
billion nations. Again, Chad is held up as an example, where a recent study
showed that less than a percent of donations reached the rural clinics they
were supposed to go to. Corrupt governments rerouting foreign aid to finance
their military budget only leads back to the conflict trap that many of the
bottom billion are subject to.
Collier
has a selection of resolutions to the economic dilemma that plagues the bottom
billion, but they are technical, complex, and revolutionarily bold. A pop
concert spanning five continents that rallies support for ‘improved
international norms of transparency on natural revenues accounting’ is hard to
imagine and boggles the mind, but it is exactly the kind of answer Collier is
calling for. The following are included in his array of economic proposals.
Targeted military interventions: With the memories of Iraq and the
practice of outside regime change through military measures fresh on the minds
of people all over the world, Collier acknowledges the political blockades that
might come with such a proposal. However, he also acknowledges that cases exist
wherein the application of outside military force has actually sparked a
movement towards economic development. The British military intervention in
Sierra Leone has, upon Collier’s analysis, provided an economic benefit that
exceeded the cost of military action by at least a factor of 32.
International charters: Applying a batch of international
charters that set new and basic benchmarks for the bottom billion and any
developing nation to follow is another proposal that is complex and challenging
by nature. The aspects of natural resources, democratization, budget
transparency, investment and the management of post-conflict situations are but
some of the fields that Collier has mentioned as noteworthy fields of debate.
Lowering of trade barriers: Lowering the existing OECD trade
barriers in a way that benefits bottom billion nations is also an unusual strategy
from Collier. Encouraging export diversification by the elimination of certain
tariff for bottom billion nations while maintaining it for well-developed
countries can, done correctly, have a positive return over many years.
Function of the WTO: A fundamental discussion that
rehashes how the WTO should behave in regards to reciprocity is also something
Collier called for. According to him, bottom billion countries should not be
bargaining with affluent nations. A trade forum that allows reasonable
concessions on the grounds of global economic development is something that
requires further thought and deliberation, if not swift implementation.
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